An Axiomatic Decomposition of Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism
  with Indifferences by Mennle, Timo & Seuken, Sven
An Axiomatic Decomposition of
Strategyproofness for Ordinal Mechanism
with Indifferences∗
Timo Mennle
University of Zurich
Sven Seuken
University of Zurich
First version: July 14, 2014
This version: July 15, 2020
Abstract
We study mechanism which operate on ordinal preference information (i.e., rank
ordered lists of alternatives) on the full domain of weak preferences that admits
indifferences. We present a novel decomposition of strategyproofness into three
axioms: separation monotonic, separation upper invariant, and separation lower
invariant. Each axiom is a natural restriction on how mechanisms can react when
agents change their opinion about the relative ranking of any two adjacently ranked
groups of alternatives. Our result extends a result from (Mennle and Seuken, 2017),
a decomposition of strategyproofness for strict preferences, to the full domain that
includes weak preferences.
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1 Introduction
Ordinal mechanisms are commonly used in markets where monetary transfers are prohib-
ited or restricted. Prominent examples include the assignment of seats at public schools,
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which is usually based on rank ordered preference lists from parents, and voting schemes,
e.g., when the International Olympic Committee must agree on where to hold the next
Olympic Games. A mechanism is said to be strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting
of their preference orders a dominant strategy for all agents. This is an important
requirement for multiple reasons: first, strategyproof mechanisms are more likely to elicit
truthful preferences from agents who act in their own best interest. This information can
then be used to determine an appealing outcome (subject to the limitations imposed by
strategyproofness); but it may also be useful beyond the role as input to the mechanism,
e.g., to learn the true demand for particular schools in school choice settings. Second, it
makes participation in the mechanism simple for the agents because they do not have to
reason about the preferences or equilibrium strategies of the other agents. Therefore,
strategyproofness is also a fairness requirement as it levels the playing field between
agents with varying cognitive and computational capabilities.
The standard definition of strategyproofness is composed of a series of incentive
constraints: it requires that for any profile of true preferences, any agent, and any
conceivable misreport by this agent, the agent should weakly prefer the outcome obtained
from reporting their preferences truthfully to the outcome from submitting the misreport.
First, observe that the number of constraints my be very large. If agents have strict
preferences over m alternatives, they may have any of m! possible strict preference orders
and submit any of possible m! ´ 1 misreports. This means that the basic definition
of strategyproofness involves an exponential number of individual constraints for any
agent in any conceivable situation. The number is even larger when they may also be
indifferent between alternatives. This large number of constraints is problematic because
it makes the strategyproofness concept unwieldy. Therefore, proving general statements
about strategyproof mechanisms often requires non-trivial arguments; and the large
number makes encoding strategyproofness as constraints to an optimization problem
infeasible under the automated mechanism design paradigm.
Second, observe that the restrictions imposed by strategyproofness are implicit and
they yield few insights about the structure of strategyproof mechanisms. Thus, it is
unclear how exactly these mechanisms look like, and it may be challenging to verify or
disprove strategyproofness of a give mechanism or a given class of mechanisms.
In this note, we address these challenges: we study the strategyproofness requirement
for ordinal mechanisms on the full domain of weak preferences. Our main contribution
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is a decomposition of strategyproofness into three simple axioms.1 This decomposition
mitigates the two concerns about strategyproofness described above. First, it provides a
substantially smaller set of conditions that is equivalent to strategyproofness. Second, the
axioms describe the ways in which strategyproof mechanisms may react to certain basic
kinds of misreports and thereby delivers a much clearer picture of what strategyproof
mechanisms look like.
2 Model
Let M be a set of m alternatives. An agent’s preference order is a weak order relation R
on the set of alternatives: a R b means that the agent prefers alternative a to alternative
b. The agent is indifferent between a and b if a R b and b R a (denoted a I b), and the
agent strictly prefers a to b if a R b but not b R a (denoted a P b). We represent the
preference order R as
M1 P . . . P Mk P . . . P MK , (1)
where pMkq1ďkďK is a partition of M such that
• a I b for all a, b PMk and all k P t1, . . . , Ku,
• a P b for any a PMk, b PMk`1 for any k P t1, . . . , K ´ 1u.
For the sake of notational simplicity, we formulate our results for situations with a single
agent; however, they all extend straightforwardly to settings with multiple agents. Let
R be the set of all possible preference orders, then a mechanism is a mapping from a
preference order to a lottery over alternatives; formally, ϕ : RÑ ∆pMq.
For any lottery x P ∆pMq and any subset A ĎM of the alternatives, let xA “ řaPA xa
denote the probability of selecting an alternative within A. Given a preference order R
and two lotteries x, y P ∆pMq, we say that x first order-stochastically dominates y at R
if, for all alternatives a PM , we have
xtjPM :j R au “
ÿ
jPM :j R a
xj ě
ÿ
jPM :j R a
yj “ ytjPM :j R au. (2)
1This result is a direct generalization of the decomposition of strategyproofness for probabilistic
assignment mechanisms on the strict preference domain into swap monotonicity, upper invariance,
and lower invariance; see Theorem 1 in (Mennle and Seuken, 2017).
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A mechanism ϕ is strategyproof if, for all pairs of preference orders pR,R1q P R2, the
lottery ϕpRq first order-stochastically dominates the lottery ϕpR1q at R.
3 The Axioms
We now define the axioms which make up our decomposition of strategyproofness. Each
axiom restricts the way in which the mechanisms can react to particular changes in the
preference report of the agent. A separation is a pair of preference orders pR,R1q P R2
such that there exists some κ P t1, . . . , Ku with
M1 P . . . P Mκ´1 P Mκ P Mκ`1 P . . . P MK ,
M1 P
1 . . . P 1 Mκ´1 P 1 M1κ P 1 M2κ P 1 Mκ`1 P 1 . . . P 1 MK ,
where M1κ 9YM2κ “Mκ is a disjoint partition of Mκ. Thus, the two preference orders of
a separation pR,R1q differ only on the relative ranking of the alternatives in Mκ: an
agent with preference order R is completely indifferent between the alternatives in Mκ,
whereas an agent with preference order R1 strictly prefers any alternative in M1κ to any
alternative in M2κ , but is indifferent between any two alternatives within M
1
κ or within
M2κ , respectively.
Observe that a separation primarily reveals information about the agent’s relative
ranking of the alternatives in Mκ. The axioms we defined impose restrictions on how
the outcomes of a mechanism can vary based on this information.
Axiom 1. A mechanism ϕ is separation responsive if, for all separations pR,R1q, we
have ϕM1κpP 1q ě ϕM1κpP q and ϕM2κpP 1q ď ϕM2κpP q.
Separation responsiveness captures the intuition that a mechanism should not assign
less probability to alternatives that the agent claims to prefer. Under a separation
responsive mechanism, these probabilities must change in the right direction if they
change at all.
Axiom 2. A mechanism ϕ is separation direct if, for all separations pR,R1q with
ϕMkpRq ‰ ϕMkpR1q for some k P t1, . . . , Ku, we have ϕM1κpP 1q ‰ ϕM1κpP q and ϕM2κpP 1q ‰
ϕM2κpP q.
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Intuitively, if a separation direct mechanism changes the outcome at all under some
separation, then this change must affect at least the probability for the sets of alternatives
for which differential preferences are reported, namely the alternatives in M1κ relative to
the alternatives in M2κ .
Axiom 3. A mechanism ϕ is separation monotonic if it is separation responsive and
separation direct.
The intuition for separation monotonicity arises from the interpretations of separation
responsiveness and directness: if a separation leads to any change in the outcome of
the mechanism, then this change must affect at least the set of alternatives that was
separated, and the change has to point in the right direction.2
Axiom 4. A mechanism ϕ is separation upper invariant if, for all separations pR,R1q,
we have ϕMkpP q “ ϕMkpP 1q for all k P t1, . . . , κ´ 1u.
Separation upper invariance yields robustness to a certain kind of strategic misreport.
Suppose that the agent is interested primarily in the probability of higher ranking
alternatives. If a mechanism is not separation upper invariant, then the agent may
improve the changes of a higher ranking alternative by performing one or multiple
separations of lower ranking sets of alternatives. In the domain of strict preferences,
separation upper invariance corresponds to upper invariance, which is equivalent to
truncation robustness (Hashimoto et al., 2014).
Axiom 5. A mechanism ϕ is separation lower invariant if, for all separations pR,R1q,
we have ϕMkpP q “ ϕMkpP 1q for all k P tκ` 1, . . . , Ku.
Separation lower invariance is the natural complement of separation upper invariance on
the lower contour set. It requires that changes in the preference order over higher ranking
alternatives do not influence the probabilities for sets of lower ranking alternatives.
4 Decomposition Results
In this section, we present our main result, the decomposition of strategyproofness.
2Separation monotonicity can be understood as swap monotonicity from (Mennle and Seuken, 2017) but
adjusted for the domain weak preferences; instead of the swaps of two adjacently ranked alternatives,
the notion of locality in this domain is described by separations.
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Theorem 1. A mechanism ϕ is strategyproof if and only if it is separation monotonic,
separation upper invariant, and separation lower invariant.
Remark 1. In the domain with indifferences, the number of possible preference orders
is apmq, the mth Fubini number, which grows super-exponentially in m. The decompo-
sition result allows us to reduce the number of constraints that we need to verify for
strategyproofness: we only need to consider separations, instead of arbitrary misreports,
and this number is bounded by 2m in the worst case (when the agent is in fact indifferent
between all alternatives), but usually much lower.
Remark 2. The requirement of separation monotonicity in Theorem 1 can be relaxed to
separation responsiveness because separation upper and lower invariance imply separation
directness (see Lemma 2).
Theorem 1 implies an equivalent condition for strateyproofness on the smaller class of
deterministic mechanisms.
Corollary 1. A deterministic mechanism ϕ is strategyproof if and only if it is separation
monotonic.
Proof. It suffices to show that for deterministic mechanisms, separation monotonicity
implies separation upper and lower invariance. Given any separation pR,R1q for which
ϕpRq ‰ ϕpR1q, separation monotonicity requires that ϕM1κpR1q ą ϕM1κpRq and ϕM2κpR1q ă
ϕM2κpRq. Since ϕ is deterministic, there must exist alternatives a P M1κ , b P M2κ such
that ϕtaupR1q “ ϕtbupRq “ 1 and ϕtaupRq “ ϕtbupR1q “ 0. In other words, ϕ selects b for
preference order R and a for R1. Thus, there is no change in the probabilities of selecting
any other alternatives.
Proof of Theorem 1
To prove Theorem 1, we first show that strategyproofness of ϕ implies the axioms
(Lemmas 1, 2, 3). Subsequently, we show the more complicated sufficiency of the axioms
for strategyproofness (Lemmas 4, 5, 6, 7, 8).
Lemma 1. If a mechanism ϕ is strategyproof, then it is separation upper invariant and
separation lower invariant.
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Proof of Lemma 1. We first show separation upper invariance. Towards contradiction,
assume that ϕ is strategyproof but not separation upper invariant. Then there exists a
separation pR,R1q, such that
ϕMk˜pRq ‰ ϕMk˜pR1q, (3)
where k˜ ă κ is the smallest index for which inequality (3) holds. If ϕMk˜pRq ă ϕMk˜pR1q,
then
k˜ÿ
k“1
ϕMkpRq ă
k˜ÿ
k“1
ϕMkpR1q, (4)
which implies that ϕpRq does not first order-stochastically dominate ϕpR1q at R, a
contradiction to strategyproofness of ϕ. Conversely, if ϕMk˜pRq ą ϕMk˜pR1q, then an
analogous argument implies that ϕpR1q does not first order-stochastically dominate ϕpRq
at R1, again a contradiction.
The proof of separation lower invariance is analogous, except that we choose k˜ ą κ to
be the greatest index for which ϕMk˜pRq ‰ ϕMk˜pR1q.
Lemma 2. If a mechanism ϕ is strategyproof, then it is separation direct.
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, ϕ is separation upper and lower invariant. Thus, for
any separation pR,R1q and any k ‰ κ, we have ϕMkpRq “ ϕMkpR1q. Since
ϕMκpRq ´ ϕMκpR1q “
ÿ
k‰κ
ϕMkpR1q ´ ϕMkpRq “ 0, (5)
the conditions under which separation directness is any restriction, never arise under ϕ.
Thus, this axiom is trivially satisfied.
Lemma 3. If a mechanism ϕ is strategyproof, then it is separation responsive.
Proof. Towards contradiction, assume that ϕ is strategyproof but not separation respon-
sive. Lemma 1 implies that, for any separation pR,R1q, we have
ϕMkpRq “ ϕMkpR1q (6)
for all k P t1, . . . , Ku and
ϕM1κpR1q ´ ϕM1κpRq “ ϕM2κpRq ´ ϕM2κpR1q. (7)
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In particular, there exists a separation pR,R1q, such that
ϕM1κpR1q ´ ϕM1κpRq “ ϕM2κpRq ´ ϕM2κpR1q ă 0. (8)
Thus,
ϕM1κpR1q `
κ´1ÿ
k“1
ϕMkpR1q ă ϕM1κpRq `
κ´1ÿ
k“1
ϕMkpRq, (9)
which means that ϕpR1q does not first order-stochastically dominate ϕpRq at R1, a
contradiction to strategyproofness.
This establishes the sufficiency-part in Theorem 1.
To show necessity, we introduce L-separations and multi-separations (Definition 1), as
well as separation-, L-separation-, and multi-separation strategyproofness (Definition 2).
We then show that the axioms imply multi-separation strategyproofness (Lemmas 4, 5,
6), which in turn implies strategyproofness (Lemmas 7, 8).
Definition 1 (L- and Multi-separation). Let pR,R1q be a pair of preference orders:
• pR,R1q is called an L-separation if there exist L ě 2 and κ P t1, . . . , Ku, such that
M1 P . . . P Mκ P . . . P MK ,
M1 P
1 . . . P 1 M1κ P 1 . . . P 1 MLκ P 1 . . . P 1 MK ,
where Mκ “ ŤLl“1M lκ is a partition of Mκ (i.e., M lκ XM l1κ “ H for l ‰ l1).
• pR,R1q is called an L-separation if there exist L1, . . . , LK ě 1, such that
M1 P . . . P MK ,
M11 P
1 . . . P 1 ML11 P 1 . . . P 1 M1K P 1 . . . P 1 M
LK
K ,
where, for each k P t1, . . . , Ku, Mk “ ŤLkl“1M lk is a partition of Mk.
Definition 2 (Separation Strategyproofness). A mechanism ϕ is separation/L-separation/multi-
separation strategyproof if for any separation/L-separation/multi-separation pR,R1q we
have that
1. ϕpRq first order-stochastically dominates ϕpR1q at R,
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2. ϕpR1q first order-stochastically dominates ϕpRq at R1.
Lemma 4. If a mechanism ϕ is separation monotonic, separation upper invariant, and
separation lower invariant, then it is separation strategyproof.
Proof. Fix a separation pR,R1q. By separation upper and lower invariance, we get
that ϕMkpRq “ ϕMkpR1q for all k P t1, . . . , Ku. Thus, ϕpRq first order-stochastically
dominates ϕpR1q at R trivially. In addition, by separation responsiveness, we have
ϕM1κpP 1q ´ ϕM1κpP q `
κ´1ÿ
k“1
ϕMkpP 1q ´ ϕMkpP q ě 0. (10)
This implies that ϕpR1q first order-stochastically dominates ϕpRq at R1.
Lemma 5. If a mechanism ϕ is separation monotonic, separation upper invariant, and
separation lower invariant, then it is L-separation strategyproof for any L ě 2.
Proof. Consider an L-separation pR,R1q. As in Lemma 4, first order-stochastic dominance
of ϕpRq over ϕpR1q at R follows from separation upper and lower invariance.
We now need to verify first order-stochastic dominance of ϕpR1q over ϕpRq at R1 as
well. For this, we need to show that
lÿ
l“1
ϕM lκpP 1q ´ ϕM lκpP q ě 0 (11)
for all l P t1, . . . , Lu. Observe that any L-separation can be decomposed into a sequence
of L´ 1 separations ppR,R1q, pR1, R2q, . . . , pRL´2, R1qq, where
. . . P
`
M1κ Y . . .YMLκ
˘
P . . . ,
. . . P 1 pM1κq P 1
`
M2κ Y . . .YMLκ
˘
P 1 . . . ,
. . . P 2 pM1κq P 2 pM2κq P 2
`
M3κ Y . . .YMLκ
˘
P 2 . . . ,
. . .
. . . PL´2 pM1κq PL´2 . . . PL´2
`
ML´1κ YMLκ
˘
PL´2 . . . ,
. . . P 1 pM1κq P 1 . . . P 1
`
MLκ
˘
P 1 . . . .
By separation responsiveness, we have ϕM1κpRq ď ϕM1κpR1q, and separation upper invari-
9
ance implies ϕM1κpR1q “ ϕM1κpR2q “ . . . “ ϕM1κpR1q. Thus,
ϕM1κpR1q ´ ϕM1κpRq ě 0. (12)
Next, we consider a different sequence of separations, where
. . . P
`
M1κ Y . . .YMLκ
˘
P . . . ,
. . . P 1 pM1κ YM2κq P 1
`
M3κ Y . . .YMLκ
˘
P 1 . . . ,
. . . P 2 pM1κ YM2κq P 2 pM3κq P 2
`
M3κ Y . . .YMLκ
˘
P 2 . . . ,
. . .
. . . PL´3 pM1κ YM3κq PL´3 . . . PL´3
`
ML´1κ YMLκ
˘
PL´3 . . . ,
. . . PL´2 pM1κ YM2κq PL´2 . . . PL´2
`
MLκ
˘
PL´2 . . . ,
. . . P 1 pM1κq P 1 pM2κq P 1 . . . P 1
`
MLκ
˘
P 1 . . . .
Again by separation responsiveness, we have ϕM1κYM2κpRq ď ϕM1κYM2κpR1q, separation
upper and lower invariance imply ϕM1κYM2κpR1q “ . . . “ ϕM1κYM2κpR1q. Thus,
2ÿ
l“1
ϕM lκpR1q ´ ϕM lκpRq ě 0. (13)
We can verify (11) analogously for all l P t3, . . . , Lu.
Lemma 6. If a mechanism ϕ is separation monotonic, separation upper invariant, and
separation lower invariant, then it is multi-separation strategyproof.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 5, first order-stochastic dominance of ϕpRq over ϕpR1q at
R follows from separation upper and lower invariance. Observe that any multi-separation
can be decomposed into a sequence of L-separations. Thus, arguments similar to those
in Lemma 5 yield first order-stochastic dominance of ϕpR1q over ϕpRq at R1.
Definition 3. A mapping u : M Ñ R` is called a utility function. u is said to be
consistent with a preference order R if upaq ě upbq whenever a R b, denoted u „ R.
Lemma 7. For any preference orders R,R1 and consistent utility functions u „ R and
u1 „ R1, the line segment described by
tuα “ p1´ αqu` αu1, α P r0, 1su (14)
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passes through a sequence of preference orders R “ R0, R1, . . . , RS´1, RS “ R1, such
that for all s P t0, . . . , S ´ 1u either the pair pRs, Rs`1q or the pair pRs`1, Rsq is a
multi-separation.
Proof. For each Rs through which the line tuα : α P r0, 1su passes, let αs P r0, 1s be
such that uαs „ Rs. Assume towards contradiction that, for some s, neither the pair
pRs, Rs`1q nor the pair pRs`1, Rsq is a multi-separation. Then there must exist objects
a, b, c, d (not necessarily different) such that a P s b and c Is d but a Is`1 b and c P s`1 d.
This means that
uαspaq ą uαspbq, uαspcq “ uαspdq,
uαs`1paq “ uαs`1pbq, uαs`1pcq ą uαs`1pdq.
Taking the “average” of uαs and uαs`1 , we get a new utility function
u˜ “ u 1
2
pαs`αs`1q “
1
2
`
uαs ` uαs`1
˘
, (15)
which lies on the line between u and u1, but where
u˜paq ą u˜pbq and u˜pcq ą u˜pdq. (16)
Thus, the line passes through a different type R˜ with u˜ „ R˜ between Rs and Rs`1, which
contradicts the assumption that the line passes directly from Rs to Rs`1.
Lemma 8. If a mechanism ϕ is multi-separation strategyproof, then it is strategyproof.
Proof. The arguments in this proof are similar to the proof of the local sufficiency result
in (Carroll, 2012).
We use the fact that for any two lotteries x, y P ∆pMq and any preference order R, x
weakly first order-stochastically dominates y at R if and only if, for any utility function
u „ R, we have
xu, x´ yy “
ÿ
jPM
upjq ¨ pxj ´ yjq ě 0. (17)
For two preference orders R,R1 and consistent utility functions u „ R and u1 „ R1, let
tuα : α P r0, 1su be the line segment in the space of utility functions that connects u and
u1. Following Lemma 7, let αs P r0, 1s be such that uαs „ Rs (i.e., uαs is a utility function
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on the line segment and consistent with Rs), where Rs is the respective element of the
sequence of preference orders through which the line segment passes. By construction,
αs`1uαs ´ αsuαs`1 “ pαs`1 ´ αsq ¨ u, (18)
and from multi-separation strategyproofness of ϕ, we get
@
uαs , ϕpRsq ´ ϕpRs`1q
D ě 0 and @uαs`1 , ϕpRs`1q ´ ϕpRsqD ě 0. (19)
Therefore, for all s P t0, . . . , S ´ 1u,
@
u, ϕpRsq ´ ϕpRs`1qD ě 0. (20)
Summing over all s yields
xu, ϕpRq ´ ϕpR1qy “ @u, ϕpR0q ´ ϕpRSqD ě 0, (21)
which concludes the proof.
Lemma 8 concludes the proof of sufficiency of the axioms for strategyproofness.
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